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U.S. Tax Treaties 
Third-Country Use: 
Is Time 
Running Out? 
by STEVEN P. HANNES / Partner, Washington Service Center 
T he U.S. has had income tax treaties with foreign nations since 1939. The network of U.S. 
income tax treaties has expanded 
significantly since then, especially in 
the last decade. With those that were 
ratified by the Senate in 1981, the U.S. 
now has 35 such treaties in force, with 
two others awaiting ratification 
overseas. 
Now, however, this expansion is 
threatened by claims that U.S. tax 
treaties are being improperly used by 
residents of "third"countries (not the 
U.S. or its treaty partner) at times 
with the blessing of the U.S. treaty 
partner. Claims of such treaty abuse or 
"treaty shopping" also threaten existing 
treaty relationships with the Nether-
lands, the Netherlands Antilles, and 
Switzerland. 
What effect do income tax treaties 
have on the U.S. economy? In 1978, $3.9 
billion of income was paid to residents 
of tax treaty countries who had U.S. 
investments. This represented 87 
percent of the income earned by 
foreign persons on U.S. investments. If 
one assumes a 10 percent return on 
investment, this means U.S. investments 
held by or through treaty country 
residents totaled at least $39 billion in 
1978. Thus, the treaties provide protec-
tion for significant amounts of cross-
border investments. Critics claim, 
however, that some of these treaties are 
being used improperly, thereby 
depriving the U.S. of needed and 
legitimate tax revenue. 
Statistics published in 1981 in a widely 
publicized U.S. government report, Tax 
Havens and Their Use by United States 
Taxpayers—An Overview, suggest that 
certain jurisdictions with low tax rates 
which have tax treaties with the United 
States are vehicles for disproportion-
ately large amounts of both U.S. invest-
ment overseas and foreign investment 
into the United States. According to the 
report, U.S. gross dividends, interest, 
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and other payments made in 1978 to 
inhabitants of Switzerland and the 
Netherlands Antilles represented 
30 percent of all U.S. payments to 
nonresident aliens. Other data in the 
report points to a five-fold increase 
between 1968 and 1976 in the assets of 
U.S.-controlled corporations formed in 
tax havens. By 1978, U.S. direct invest-
ments overseas in tax haven jurisdic-
tions were more than $23 billion; in 
1968, the figure had been approximately 
$4.7 billion. Several of these tax haven 
jurisdictions, the British Virgin Islands, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands Antilles, and 
Switzerland, have U.S. income tax 
treaties. 
Depending on one's perspective, 
these published figures merely confirm 
the best hopes or worst fears of many 
concerning the use of U.S. income tax 
treaties. That is, for some time many 
people have believed that U.S. and 
foreign taxpayers were using U.S. 
income tax treaties with tax havens to 
channel investment from and to the 
United States and to and from residents 
in countries without U.S. tax treaties. 
One of the principal objectives of this 
pattern of investment through treaty 
countries has been to reduce income 
tax in the country where the investment 
is finally made—the "source"country. 
Is the long-range impact of this 
cross-border investment strategy 
harmful to U.S. interests? Should the 
U.S. Treasury proceed with its 
announced policy of curtailing or 
ending third-country use of U.S. tax 
treaties with low-tax jurisdictions? Is the 
issue really one of lost U.S. tax revenue? 
This article explores these questions. 
How U.S. Tax Treaties Are Used 
An April 27,1982, report on the United 
States Model Income Tax Convention 
prepared by the New York State Bar 
Association illustrates how U.S. tax 
treaties are used. "It is common knowl-
edge, for example, that Canadian direct 
investment in the United States almost 
invariably is made through Netherlands 
holding companies, since the U.S. 
withholding tax on dividends and 
interest paid to a Netherlands corpora-
tion (generally 5 percent and zero, 
respectively) is substantially less than 
the U.S. withholding tax on interest and 
dividends paid to Canada (currently 15 
percent) and the Netherlands permits 
holding companies for this purpose in 
consideration of the payment of a 
nominal amount of income tax. For the 
same reasons, Australian direct invest-
ment tends to flow through Nether-
lands Antilles structures; and substantial 
investments from countries with whom 
the U.S. has no tax treaties have been 
channeled through the Netherlands, 
the Netherlands Antilles, and the British 
Virgin Islands." 
Such third-country use of U.S. tax 
treaties raises a number of questions 
and issues. For inbound investments, 
treaties that are easily used by residents 
of third countries give a U.S. treaty 
partner, such as the Netherlands 
Antilles, the extraordinary right to 
determine who will receive U.S. tax 
breaks. Also important, easy and 
favorable access to the United States 
through a low-tax U.S. treaty jurisdiction 
eliminates an incentive for other 
jurisdictions to create their own direct 
treaty relationship with the United 
States. 
Similarly, a country with a tax treaty 
relationship with the United States may 
be unwilling to revise that treaty to 
make a tax concession to United States 
investors if its own nationals already 
can achieve low United States taxation 
by using other treaties. For example, if 
Canadian or German investors can 
reduce United States tax by going 
through the Netherlands Antilles, then 
Canada or West Germany may think it 
unnecessary to revise downward the 
tax burden in the Canada-United States 
or Germany-United States income tax 
treaties. In such circumstances, Canada 
or West Germany might think 
(correctly) it would be making a 
unilateral concession by reducing the 
tax burden in its treaty with the United 
States. 
Thus, from the perspective of the 
United States government, the third-
country-use issue involves (1) having 
the United States regain control 
over who receives U.S. tax benefits, 
(2) expanding the U.S. treaty network to 
cover developing countries, and 
(3) having better leverage to improve 
current U.S. tax treaties, particularly 
those with a few developed countries. 
The issue of "better leverage"cannot be 
overemphasized. For example, West 
Germany continues to refuse to agree 
to tax treaty modifications to ameliorate 
the recently enacted West German tax 
that discriminates against U.S. invest-
ment in West Germany. Many believe 
that the German government would be 
more willing to renegotiate the U.S.-
Germany treaty if West German 
residents with U.S. investments could 
not continue to reduce unilaterally their 
U.S. taxes by going through third 
countries with more favorable U.S. tax 
treaties. 
Use Once Tolerated by Treasury 
At the same time, it is widely recognized 
that third-country use of treaties brings 
needed capital into the U.S. and that 
prior policies and practices of the 
Treasury tolerated if not encouraged 
third-country use of tax treaties. For 
example, significant Eurodollar debt 
offerings have been and continue to be 
placed by U.S. companies through the 
Netherlands Antilles to reduce their 
interest costs and bring down the U.S. 
tax cost of such financing. Until 
recently, the IRS blessed or ignored this 
situation. Moreover, the Treasury 
recognized the economic advantage of 
the Eurodollar source of capital when 
it supported legislation last year 
(H.R. 4618) that would amend the 
Internal Revenue Code to unilaterally 
allow tax-free Eurodollar financings that 
otherwise might be placed through the 
Netherlands Antilles. 
Similarly, U.S. companies with foreign 
subsidiaries want to reduce their 
foreign taxes and have used other treaty 
networks, such as the Netherlands 
network, to accomplish this objective 
for investments in countries not having 
U.S. treaties. This objective generally 
has not been criticized from tax policy 
grounds. Indeed, the Treasury and IRS 
believe that reducing foreign tax 
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liability is a valid business goal from the 
U.S. perspective. The Treasury has tried 
to conclude income tax treaties with 
countries such as Brazil and Indonesia 
that are important areas of investment 
for U.S. persons. One objective of these 
treaties would be to reduce Brazilian 
and Indonesian tax on U.S investment 
there. Similarly the Treasury's interest in 
attracting capital from third-country 
users of U.S. tax treaties has been 
reflected in its often expressed desire to 
conclude tax reducing treaties with 
countries such as Saudi Arabia that are 
important sources for capital invest-
ment into the U.S. and thought to be 
heavy third-country users of U.S. tax 
treaties. 
In the end, modifications to the 
Internal Revenue Code and new direct 
treaty relationships could protect much 
of the U.S. tax savings currently enjoyed 
by those using a treaty country as 
intermediary. From the U.S. govern-
ment's perspective, the issue of is not 
U.S. tax revenue per se. Through an 
expanded U.S. treaty network, a U.S. 
investment overseas might, in fact, bear 
less foreign tax than this investment 
bears today by going through an 
intermediary treaty jurisdiction. Thus, 
the issue is not, from a U.S. perspective, 
whether a few treaties encourage an 
outflow of U.S. capital. The issues are, as 
explained above, ones of regaining 
control over U.S. tax benefits, expanding 
the treaty network, and obtaining 
leverage to improve current U.S. tax 
treaties. 
Origin of Current Focus 
The current focus on third-country use 
of tax treaties can be traced to a 
favorable 1975 IRS ruling concerning the 
third-country-use issue. That is, third-
country use of U.S. income tax treaties 
was officially and favorably highlighted 
when the IRS published Rev. Rul. 75-23, 
1975-1 C.B. 290, which involved a 
Netherlands Antilles corporation 
organized "primarily to invest foreign 
capital"in major commercial real estate 
projects in the U.S. This ruling held that 
U.S. taxes were reduced by reason of 
the U.S.-Netherlands Income Tax 
Convention as extended to the Nether-
lands Antilles. The ruling surprised 
many and was widely perceived as a 
road map, acceptable to the IRS, for 
third-country investment in the U.S. 
through the Netherlands Antilles. 
While the Treasury apparently 
believed that the Netherlands Antilles 
Convention authorized third-country 
investment, Rev. Rul. 75-23 highlighted 
a general issue that the Treasury 
decided warranted action. Shortly after 
publication of this ruling, the Treasury 
announced that at least certain types of 
third-country use of U.S. income tax 
treaties were unacceptable as a matter 
of policy. This announcement came in 
1976, when the Treasury Department 
published the first U.S. Model Income 
Tax Convention. The 1976 model 
contained a provision, Article 16, 
designed to curtail certain forms of 
third-country use of U.S. tax treaties. It 
focused on dividends, interest, and 
royalties, and denied treaty benefits 
only if the treaty partner's tax on such 
income was less than the tax it generally 
imposed. 
Earlier in 1976, the Treasury had given 
a warning that it was adopting a general 
policy of curtailing third-country use of 
U.S. tax treaties when it released the 
then proposed U.S.-U.K. Income Tax 
Convention, which contained a limited 
Article-16-type provision. When the U.S 
model was republished in May 1977, it 
adhered to the 1976 model's policy and 
provisions against certain types of 
third-country use. 
As the Treasury continued to nego-
tiate treaties following the policies 
of Article 16, and as the issue con-
cerning treaty shopping received 
more attention, it became apparent that 
Article 16 of the 1977 model easily could 
be avoided. As a result, treaty shopping 
was continuing, and the Treasury's 
commitment to end third-country use 
was questioned. For example, hearings 
were held by the House of Representa-
tives which focused on this and other 
treaty issues. [5ee Income Tax Treaties: 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight of the House Committee on 
Ways and Means, 96, 2nd Sess. (1980).] 
During the hearings, Article 16 of the 
1977 model was criticized as ineffective. 
Commitment to End Use 
In June 1981 the Treasury demonstrated 
its commitment to end most third-
country use. The Treasury published a 
new draft-model U.S. Income Tax 
Convention. The draft revised and 
updated the 1977 model in a number of 
ways, one of the most important of 
which was to reform substantially 
Article 16 so that it broadly attacked 
treaty shopping. The article applies to 
source-basis tax benefits for all types of 
income, not just dividends, interest, and 
royalties. 
Under the draft, treaty benefits are 
denied whether or not the treaty 
country reduces its tax on the income 
in question. The focus is on third-
country ownership, not on the tax 
burden imposed by the treaty partner. 
As a general rule, when a third-country 
resident owns 25 percent or more of a 
tax treaty corporation, treaty benefits 
are denied under the 1981 draft—unless, 
for example, the corporation has an 
active business in the treaty country 
and there is a business purpose for the 
third-country resident making the 
investments in the U.S. through the 
treaty corporation. 
On September 15,1981, the Treasury 
turned the screws even further when it 
stated in a letter to the chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Charles H. Percy that the 
Treasury was withdrawing from the 
Senate the proposed income tax 
treaties with Cyprus and the British 
Virgin Islands. These treaties had been 
negotiated by the Carter administration, 
and both had relatively sophisticated 
provisions designed to limit the extent 
to which residents of third countries 
could use these two treaties to receive 
U.S. tax benefits. 
Based on its review of these treaties, 
the Reagan Treasury concluded that the 
opportunities which potentially 
remained for such third countries were 
"too great for us to tolerate." The 
Treasury threatened, moreover, that if 
satisfactory negotiations were not 
concluded by early 1982, the Reagan 
administration would serve notice of 
termination for the existing British 
Virgin islands (BVI) Convention. On 
June 30,1982, the Treasury followed 
through on its threat. On that date the 
U.S., through the acting secretary of 
state, terminated the BVI treaty, 
effective January 1,1983. 
Provisions to Prevent Treaty Shopping 
At this time, negotiations are underway 
between the U.S. and three jurisdictions 
currently being used by residents of 
third countries to invest in the U.S. 
These are the Netherlands, the Nether-
lands Antilles, and Switzerland. At least 
one of these three, the Netherlands, is a 
significant route for U.S. investment in 
developing countries. 
Treasury officials have openly stated 
on many occasions that these three 
negotiations involve, among other 
things, the third-country-use issue, and 
that it is the Treasury's objective to add 
to the new tax treaties with these 
jurisdictions, as well as to tax treaties 
with other countries, strong provisions 
designed to prevent treaty shopping. 
Based on the public statements and 
actions of the Treasury Department 
through July 1982, perhaps no more 
than four years will pass before third-
country use of U.S. tax treaties will have 
been substantially eliminated. 
The time required to curtail third-
country use of U.S tax treaties depends, 
in part, upon legislation that would 
change the Internal Revenue Code to 
allow tax-free Eurodollar financings and 
thereby cut down on the role of the 
Antilles Convention. If the 30 percent 
U.S. withholding tax were repealed—or 
amended so that it did not apply to the 
type of Eurodollar offering currently 
running through the Netherlands 
Antilles—then U.S. dependence on the 
Netherlands Antilles for financing 
would end and the Treasury would 
have greater leverage in its negotiations 
with the Netherlands Antilles. 
Conversely, if the statutory 30 percent 
withholding tax on interest is not 
amended, more time will be required 
for the Treasury to conclude the 
Netherlands Antilles negotiations. 
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(With new code provisions imposing, 
for the first time, domestic withholding 
on dividends and interest, it is unlikely 
that the Congress will enact legislation 
to exempt foreign persons from U.S. 
withholding taxes on interest.) 
Alternatively, one probable compro-
mise open to the Treasury is to allow 
the Netherlands Antilles to continue to 
be, at least for a period of time, a 
vehicle for Eurodollar financing by U.S. 
companies. This would recognize the 
unique status of the Netherlands 
Antilles, a status officially tolerated, if 
not encouraged, in the past by the 
Treasury. 
Meanwhile, U.S. persons investing 
outside the U.S. and foreign persons 
investing in the U.S. already find 
themselves having to adjust to new 
rules and policies. Termination of the 
British Virgin Islands treaty at the end of 
1982 certainly will cause some restruc-
turing. If the Treasury's objective of 
curtailing third-country use is realized, 
there will be additional dislocation or 
relocation of U.S. investments by 
foreign persons who have used the 
Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, and 
Switzerland treaties. 
One possibility for the future is that 
countries which do not now have U.S. 
income tax treaties will establish a 
direct income tax treaty relationship 
with the U.S. Thus, investors from these 
countries will be able to save U.S. taxes 
directly and perhaps duplicate or better 
the tax savings they currently enjoy 
through treaties with favorable, low 
source-rates of tax, such as those with 
the Netherlands and Netherlands 
Antilles. Where such treaty relation-
ships are not possible, investors will 
have to consider whether the additional 
tax burden is so great as to require 
divestiture. 
Conclusion 
Foreign persons are frequently attracted 
to U.S. investments because of the 
relative economic and political stability 
of the U.S. Tax benefits are a secondary 
consideration, and even without special 
tax treaty benefits U.S. taxes can be 
reduced through proper planning to a 
level that appears low by comparison to 
the tax burden of other countries. Thus, 
an increase in U.S. taxes due to the 
scheduled termination or revision of 
U.S. treaties might be tolerated by some 
investors. 
The U.S. corporations and individuals 
investing in developing countries 
through other treaty jurisdictions will 
certainly encourage the Treasury to 
expand the U.S. tax treaty network as 
the Treasury limits third-country use. It 
is difficult to predict how fast the U.S. 
treaty network can expand or whether 
the source-basis foreign tax benefits 
achieved through an expanded network 
will be comparable to those currently 
enjoyed. Certainly, U.S. persons 
investing overseas will applaud efforts 
that help the Treasury achieve more 
favorable treatment from our current 
treaty partners, such as Canada and 
West Germany. 
In conclusion, it remains to be seen 
whether the potential cost of the 
Treasury's anti-treaty-shopping program 
—a potential reduction in the flow of 
capital to the United States and a 
possible increase in the foreign tax 
liability of U.S. persons investing in 
countries without U.S. tax treaties-will 
be temporary or permanent, small or 
great. It is clear, however, that the 
real motivating force of the anti-
treaty-shopping program is not, as such, 
U.S. tax revenue. The issue is whether 
the U.S. government will regain control 
over the U.S. tax system to expand the 
U.S. tax treaty network, improve 
existing treaty relationships, and target 
U.S. tax savings on inbound investment 
to particular countries. £ 
Steven P. Hannes, a principal in the firm's 
Washington, D.C. Service Center and 
chairman of its International Tax Specialty 
Group, joined Touche Ross in March 1982. 
Previously, Mr. Hannes was the associate 
international tax counsel of the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, for which he 
participated in the negotiation of U.S. 
income tax treaties with such countries as 
Argentina, Canada, Cyprus, Germany, 
Jamaica, Nigeria, Norway, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom. 
